The history of the international economy is regularly told through the lens of the rise and fall of the great powers. Angus Maddison (1982) characterized the dynamics of global growth in terms of the gap between the economic leaders and economic followers and the moving technological frontier defined by the achievements of a rotating cast of leading economic powers. Charles Kindleberger described global dynamics in terms of the changing identity but unchanging importance of the lead economy, which in his analysis plays a key role in stabilizing the international system (see Kindleberger 1973 Kindleberger , 1988 . These stories are told in terms of British hegemony in the 19th century (emphasizing the imperialism of free trade, which made available essential supplies of cheap cotton and opened foreign markets to exports of British manufactures, rendering Britain the leading trading and exporting nation as late as 1913), followed by U.S. hegemony in the 20th century (courtesy of what is sometimes referred to as the Bretton Woods-GATT system) and (extrapolating) Chinese hegemony in the 21st.
Sometimes this same story is told thr ough the lens of currencies (see for example Williamson 2012) . The 19th century international economy -the first age of globalization and the era of the international gold standard -was dominated by the pound sterling. This was when the Bank of England served as "conductor of the international orchestra," as John Maynard Keynes put it (Keynes 1930 ).
Britain's role as the leading foreign lender and home to the world's most liquid financial market gave its central bank singular leverage over the international monetary system. The country's control of colonial trade, trade with India in particular, smoothed the adjustment of its balance of payments and allowed the Bank to stabilize the operation as the system at low cost (a recent treatment is de and post-Bretton Woods Systems but as the "gold-dollar system" and the "dollar standard" (see Gilbert 1968 and McKinnon 1996 .
Extrapolating into the future, it is suggested that the global economy of the 21st century will be organized around the currency of China, the largest national economy, and regulated by its central bank. China is poised to overtake the United States as the largest economy, much as the U.S. overtook Britain in the late 19th century. It follows that for the same reasons the dollar overtook sterling as the dominant international currency, the renminbi is poised to overtake the dollar. Or so it is argued. In particular, it is argued by Arvind Subramanian of the Peterson Institute of International Economics, who has advanced the case in a series of provocative books and articles (Subramanian 2010, Subramanian and Kessler 2013) . Those who see China as the emerging economic superpower more in Asia than globally similarly anticipate that the renminbi will dominate mainly in that part of the world (Park and Song 2011) . Others who question this scenario of American economic decline and Chinese dominance similarly question whether the dollar will be superseded by the renminbi (see e.g. James 2009a , Prasad 2014 ). This view, that economic dominance and monetary-cum-financial dominance go hand, has a basis in history (see also Cohen 2013; Flandreau and Jobst 2009; Cohen and Benney 2011) . It also has a basis in theory. It flows from models in which network externalities are powerful and first-mover advantage matters importantly (see e.g. Krugman 1980 Krugman ,1984 Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui 1993; and Rey 2001) . The currency of the country that has, historically, been the leading commercial and financial power is the natural first mover, has the largest installed base, and enjoys an intrinsic comparative advantage. When network increasingly 1) My own discussion is in Eichengreen (2013a). returns are sufficiently strong, it follows that international currency status is a natural monopoly. When such increasing returns are strong, in other words, there is room for only one consequential global currency, namely that of the dominant economy. In the past it was sterling. Now it is in the dollar. And in the future it will be the renminbi.
How long in the future is a separate question. Models featuring strong network effects can also be models in which persistence is strong. 2) Historically, a very large shock (a world war, for example) has been required to displace it. It follows that a national currency can retain its international role even after the issuer has lost its economic, fiscal and political dominance, just as sterling hung on for decades after the U.S. surpassed Britain in sheer economic size in the 1870s and as the leading commercial and financial power in the 1910s.
But this also means that an international currency can retain its dominance even after the issuer has lost the economic, fiscal and political capacity to provide international currency services on the scale required by the expanding global economy. The results can be awkward. De Cecco (1974) emphasized the relative economic decline of Britain before 1913 in conjunction with the continued dependence of the world economy on a sterling-centered system as a factor in the financial tensions and economic instability in the period leading up to World War I. Others, similarly, attribute global imbalances at the turn of the early 21st century and even the global financial crisis that followed soon thereafter to the world's dependence for international liquidity on a United States that accounted for a declining share of an expanding global economy and therefore with a declining capacity to provide safe and liquid assets on the requisite scale (for balanced appraisals see Whelan 2010, Borio and Disyatat and Rogoff 2011) . This is one way of understanding the chronic fragility of the international monetary system, a phenomenon that has long occupied economic historians and troubled policy makers.
While compelling, this view is based on a limited empirical foundation. We know something about the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves in
2) The earliest and still most influential formalization of the point is Arthur (1989 Bunn (1988), and Clark (2003) . For a distinct but related view see Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) . 5)
Where the old view emphasized network effects, the new view emphasizes open systems, as just noted. Where the old view placed great weight on network effects, first-mover advantage and lock-in, the new view posits that interchangeability costs are not that high and first-mover advantage can be overcome relatively quickly.
Where the old view suggested that network increasing returns are so strong that only one true global currency can exist at a point in time, the new view suggests that increasing returns are not so strong as to rule out the existence of multiple international currencies at a point in time. 6) Where the old view found support in the dollar's dominance in the second half of the 20th century, the new view finds support in other periods during which several currencies have simultaneously
3) Even the COFER data base is imperfect, since some countries, notably China, do not report the currency composition of their international reserves to the IMF. On the COFER data base, see http://www.imf.org/ external/np/sta/cofer/eng/ . 4) In particular, I will report on a project in which I have been engaged (together with collaborators including Marc Flandreau, Arnaud Mehl and Livia Chitu) that seeks to fill in the missing middle, providing more information on international currencies in the 20th century, and especially in the under-documented era prior to 1970. 5) The term "new view" of international currency competition was first used by Frankel (2011) . 6) In their calibrated model of international currency status, Portes and Rey (1998) show that a mixed equilibrium (i.e. multiple international currencies) is possible despite network externalities.
played consequential international roles. Where the old view implied that the dollar's dominance might persist for an extended period, the new view predicts that the dollar will have rivals sooner rather than later. That supposes, of course, that the potential rivals get their acts together, an observation which will lead me at the end to make some brief remarks about the euro and the renminbi. 2 . The precision of the estimates can be questioned, as always, but not the overall 7) Eichengreen and Flandreau (2014) discuss the role of the gold standard and the growth of foreign lending in encouraging the practice. Flandreau and Ugolini (2013) argue that the Overend, Gurney crisis in 1866 and the government's constructive response were the key events that solidified investors' expectations of market liquidity, in London in particular, encouraging the development of the new key currency system. 8) Austria-Hungary, to be precise. Source: Lindert (1969) picture, which is inconsistent with the natural monopoly view. We see how, circa 1899 sterling accounted for the majority of identified foreign exchange reserves, In millinons of pounds sterling Source: Eichengreen and Flandreau (2012) course. But more support for the new view can be gleaned from evidence on various other aspects. Eichengreen and Flandreau (2012) Finally, we can consider the currency denomination of transactions in global oil markets. This is another domain for which it is argued, on the basis of recent experience, that network increasingly returns are strong and a single currency tends to dominate. We have evidence on this question for the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s for European countries, presented by Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl (2014a). 12) As depicted in Figure 6 , this shows, once again, that payment for oil imports was made, in more or less equal amounts, in dollar and nondollar currencies, where nondollar means, essentially, sterling. It can be argued that the 11) Adding Commonwealth countries to the sample of countries shown in Figure 5 , in particular Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa (all of which were titled towards sterling issuance largely due to their political ties with the U.K.) confirms that there was room for more than one international financial currency then: by 1931, the share of the dollar (45 per cent) was almost equal to that of sterling (51 per cent). 12) The data they utilize were gathered by statisticians employed by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, the predecessor to today's OECD) on the basis of submissions by 16 European countries participating in the European Recovery Program (recipients of Marshall Plan aid). See ECA (1949). These observations of how the dollar had come to rival and, in some cases, surpass sterling as an international and reserve currency already in the 1930s, undermining the case that international currency status is a natural monopoly, raise the troubling question of why these facts were not appreciated previously.
One answer is that much of the ground the dollar gained as an international currency status is a natural monopoly, raise the troubling question of why these facts were not appreciated previously. One answer is that much of the ground the Source: Eichengreen and Flandreau (1999) Another feature of the period is the regionalization of foreign exchange holdings (see Nurkse 1944 and James 2009b) . Sterling remained more popular in the Sterling Area (hence the name), whose members pegged their currencies to the pound or at least shadowed it. In contrast, dollar reserves dominated across much of Latin America. Figure 9 shows the case of the Scandinavian countries, which move from diversified reserve portfolios in the 1930s to sterling dominated portfolios in the 1930s, and finally back into dollar, at least to a limited extent, in the late 1930s when war clouds begin to gather over Europe.
What then happened after World War II? Although evidence from the international oil market, noted above, provides a hint, the picture remains opaque. Using sources like Horsefield (1969) and the IMF's annual reports, it is possible however to do better. On this basis, Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl (2014b) reconstruct the complete time series of global foreign exchange reserves, by currency, from Source: Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl (2014b) 1947 to the present, as shown in Figure 10 . 13) A striking feature of the figure is the dominance of the British pound in the aftermath of World War II, when it accounted for more than 80 per cent of foreign exchange reserves. This is then followed by a sharp reversal of fortune, with the dollar overtaking sterling and accounting for more than 50 per cent of identified foreign exchange reserves by the early 1950s. From there, the dollar's rise continues unabated through the mid1970s. 14) Sterling's decline as a share of global reserves similarly continues unabated and reaches its current levels in the low single digits at around the same time. 13) Global subject to the caveat in footnote 5 above. 14) This is the case of Eurodollar assets, which are included along with U.S.-issued reserve assets denominated in dollars.
Still, the dominance of sterling at the beginning of the period and the subsequent reversal of fortune are the figure's most striking features. The numerical dominance of sterling in 1947 reflected the willingness of the United Kingdom's wartime allies to accept sterling-denominated claims on the British government in payment for materiel and foodstuffs provided to the British economy and its armies overseas. Much of the sterling held in 1947 was accumulated because of these special wartime circumstances (details are in Schenk 2013). It followed that many of sterling's holders wished to transform it into other reserve assets, the dollar being the obvious alternative, and/or to use it to purchase merchandise (that is, to liquidate it entirely), which they did over time to the extent that such conversion and liquidation were permitted. Hence the reversal evident in Figure 10 . At one level, not that much changes with this structural break. In particular, the big shift away from the dollar forecast by some contemporaries failed to materialize. At the same time, some changes are evident. 15) A selection of these regressions, from Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl (2014b) , is shown in Table 1 .
(1 There is evidence there that network effects grow weaker between the two periods, consistent with the "new view" of reserve currency competition. Inertia or persistence grows strong (perhaps reflecting habit formation, and perhaps reflecting the absence of viable alternatives to the dollar following sterling's decline). 16) Policy credibility, meanwhile, also becomes more important.
15) This table from Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl (2014b) distinguishes pre-and post-1973 periods rather than before and after 1968, consistent with the earlier literature, but the same patterns carry over if instead we break the sample in the late 1960s. 16) This is as good a place as any to draw the distinction between network effects and persistence, and to emphasize that one does not imply the other. Persistence can have other sources besides network effects giving rise to first-mover advantage (habit formation, for example, or the absence of low-cost alternatives for providing reserves on the scale demanded). As David (1986 David ( , 1990 But the fact that network effects are not everything suggests that there is also a role for supplementary sources of international liquidity, for example China and the renminbi. This observation should be seen as reassuring, given the inability of the United States to continue to function as the sole supplier of international liquidity to a global economy that will presumably continue to expand more rapidly than the U.S. itself. And 1920s history suggests that new sources of liquidity effects may increase the attractions of a particular standard (in this case, a currency standard) at a specific point in time without preventing market participants from shifting to another standard at the next point in time, assuming that lock-in mechanisms are weak and agents are able to coordinate their actions. The success with which open standards for personal electronics have been developed in recent years, weakening lock-in and facilitating shifts between operating systems, illustrates the point.
can acquire a role quite rapidly (contrary to the "old view" of international currency competition). A number of recent studies have reached similar conclusions; thus, Lee (2014) estimates that the renminbi will account for 3 to 12 per cent of global foreign exchange reserves circa 2035, which will be significantly behind the dollar but still a consequential share.
China, admittedly, faces stiff challenges in seeking to elevate the renminbi to first-class international currency status. An international currency has three essential attributes: size, stability and liquidity. The dollar was able to quickly assume an international role in the 1920s because the U.S. had the size (U.S.
financial markets already being bigger than British financial markets), the stability Freely contested elections and even limits on the exercise of power by the executive are not exactly characteristics of China's political system. But might China be able to establish limits on arbitrary executive action within the context of its prevailing political system? Perhaps. Even today, the general secretary of the 17) On the magnitude of U.S. financial markets in the 19th century and after, see Rousseau and Sylla (1999) , and on the role of the Fed in providing liquidity to the market in trade credits, or trade acceptances, see Eichengreen (2011) .
Communist Party is increasingly constrained by the National People's Congress and the diverse interests represented there. Other bureaucratic decision makers are increasingly constrained by requirements of transparency and disclosure.
Popular internet-based movements are forcing Chinese policy makers to strengthen labor and environmental standards; why not also creditor rights, one might ask?
One can imagine giving key monetary policy makers (the People's Bank of China) statutory independence from politics -a reasonably independent central bank plausibly being a prerequisite in order for foreign investors, including foreign central banks and governments, to vest confidence in a currency.
Will such changes be compatible with China's prevailing political system? Will they be enough? Only time will tell. These are not questions to which history offers clear answers.
